This article examines a hard question at the center of recent U.S. policy toward Iran: if enriched uranium at Isfahan is damaged or exposed by strikes, who will physically secure it and how would the United States or allies prevent it from becoming a weapon? It lays out the technical hurdles, the operational risks, and the political realities that make seizing or neutralizing stockpiles far more complicated than bombing infrastructure. Expect a blunt, Republican-leaning take that stresses decisive action, sober risk assessment, and the limits of airpower when dealing with nuclear material. The focus is on the concrete challenge of controlling 60 percent enriched uranium and the choices available to stop Iran from weaponizing it.
Iran is believed to hold a significant volume of uranium enriched to about 60 percent, a level dangerously close to weapons-grade. That material is not a hypothetical threat; it is a strategic asset that, if refined further, could feed a weapons program. From a practical standpoint, the immediate problem is control of the physical material rather than just degrading production facilities from the air.
“If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation,” Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, said. That blunt assessment highlights a reality many in Washington prefer to downplay: airstrikes can slow a program but they cannot reliably walk into a site and bag the goods. Any plan to secure uranium will need boots, protective gear, intelligence, and sustained access.
Officials admit enriched uranium at sites like Isfahan may be deeply buried in hardened or underground facilities and stored in mobile containers. Mobility complicates everything because it allows Tehran to move material on short notice and to scatter stockpiles. Locating every canister under wartime conditions would be a monumental intelligence and logistics task.
“It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is,” she said, which underscores how fragile any strategy relying purely on strikes would be. If storage containers are shifted, the window for safe recovery shrinks and the risk of dispersal increases. That creates dire tradeoffs between hitting targets and preserving evidence and material control.
Moving 60 percent material up to 90 percent for a weapon requires additional enrichment steps and technical expertise, and weaponization adds further complexity. Still, no one should ignore that 60 percent is alarmingly close and easier to finish than starting from low-enriched feedstock. The task of preventing that finishing step is as much political and intelligence-driven as it is military.
“Ultimately, this issue of Iran’s nuclear pursuit and their unwillingness through negotiations to stop it is something President Trump has said for a long time needs to be dealt with,” Hegseth said. That line captures a Republican impatience with endless talks when a rival is on the verge of meaningful capability. From this perspective, the goal is clear: deny Tehran the ability to finish and field a weapon, by any effective means necessary.
Experts point out significant safety and contamination risks if nuclear storage casks or cylinders are struck or mishandled. If containers holding uranium hexafluoride were breached, there would be chemical toxicity concerns and potential localized contamination that would put recovery teams at risk. Military planners have to weigh these hazards against the strategic imperative of denying the material to Iran.
“You don’t want to release the material into the surrounding areas and cause radioactive contamination,” DeVore said, and that caution is practical not ideological. Deeply buried or hardened caches are difficult to reach from the air and dangerous to assault without proper equipment and medical support. The conservative case accepts that caution but also demands plans that lead to decisive outcomes rather than perpetual degradation campaigns.
Downblending enriched uranium under international monitoring remains the safest technical fix, but it depends on political access and cooperation that Tehran is unlikely to grant now. The IAEA can verify and physically lower enrichment if it is allowed back in and given custody or oversight of materials. For Republicans skeptical of Iranian intentions, that option is attractive but currently unrealistic without a change in Tehran’s behavior.
In practical terms, a solution that truly secures enriched uranium will require either a prolonged ground operation with sustained access or a political settlement that forces Iran to hand over or downblend its stockpiles. Neither path is tidy, cheap, or comfortable, and both require hard choices about risk, force posture, and international partnerships. The United States must plan for both the operational realities on the ground and the diplomatic pressure needed to make a secure outcome possible.
Graduate Student, wife, engaged political and legal writer.