The United States has long carried NATO’s heavy lifting while many European partners skimped on defense, a pattern born of post–Cold War optimism, domestic priorities and a reliable American security umbrella; only Russia’s aggression and pressure from leaders who challenged the status quo forced a rethink, but rebuilding real capability will take years and won’t happen just by writing bigger checks.
The story goes back to the fall of the Soviet Union, when a sudden drop in perceived danger let European capitals claim a peace dividend and funnel money into welfare programs instead of armies. Politicians liked the bills that helped voters at home, so defense budgets shrank and militaries atrophied while Washington kept forces forward in Europe. That steady U.S. commitment created a moral hazard where allies could underinvest and still expect American protection.
That dynamic persisted through administrations of both parties because the U.S. repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to NATO and maintained a large footprint on the continent. “For much of the post–Cold War period, it is fair to say that Europeans underinvested in defense, partly because threats were low, and partly because a series of U.S. presidents did everything they could to convince Europeans that we would stay there forever,” Barry Posen, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told Fox News Digital. The message from Washington was reassuring, but it also let allies postpone hard choices for decades.
Between 1992 and 1999 European NATO defense spending dropped dramatically, embedding a culture of reliance on American power. As budgets shrank, defense ministries lost people, capability and industrial bases just as social programs became more entrenched politically. That made reversing the trend politically costly and operationally difficult, because cuts to welfare are visible and painful while losses in military capacity are gradual and often ignored until crisis hits.
The United States repeatedly warned allies to carry more weight. In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned European allies that “the American well can run dry” and pressed them to shoulder more of the burden. Later warnings echoed the same point: keep counting on the U.S. at your own peril. Yet rhetorical pressure seldom turned into swift, meaningful spending increases across the board.
That changed slowly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, when NATO set a 2 percent of GDP benchmark for defense spending and some allies started to increase outlays. Progress was inconsistent and often marginal, because buying gear is only the first step toward real combat readiness. Deep wounds in command experience and multinational leadership persisted after decades of American-dominated operations.
The real jolt arrived in two parts: a more brazen Russian threat in 2022 and political pressure from leaders willing to challenge complacency. “What really woke everyone up were two things,” Townsend said. “One was the 2022 invasion by Putin the second time. And then the second was Trump.” Trump’s blunt willingness to question unconditional protection forced capitals to rethink free rides and put rapid defense investment on the table.
Allied leaders responded with a new, ambitious pledge at NATO’s Hague summit: aim for 5 percent of GDP on defense and related investments by 2035. That marks a substantive shift from the old 2 percent target and signals recognition that the post–Cold War complacency is over. But promises and budget lines are not the same as integrated capability or combat experience ready to perform under stress.
Europe still leans heavily on U.S. strengths like strategic airlift, missile defense, intelligence and the nuclear deterrent, and rebuilding those capabilities won’t happen overnight. John Byrne of Concerned Veterans for America warned about the soft underbelly of the recovery: “They don’t have the experience,” Byrne told Fox News Digital. Pushing money into procurement is smart, but people, training and command know-how require time in the field.
Command expertise is a distinct commodity that can’t be purchased off a table. “You can buy equipment,” Byrne said. “You can’t instantly buy command experience.” Large coalition operations demand seasoned leaders who understand logistics, coalition politics and the fog of war—skills that atrophied when Americans led most multinational commands for decades.
The bottom line is plain: increased European spending is welcome and necessary, and pressure from Washington worked where decades of gentle nudging did not. Republican insistence on fair burden sharing helped break the cycle of dependency, but turning money into a credible deterrent will take sustained political will and hard, often unpopular choices by European voters and their leaders.
Until those choices are fully made and implemented, the United States will remain the decisive force in NATO, and American taxpayers will rightly demand clearer commitments and measurable progress from allies so that burden sharing becomes real, not just a set of budget promises.
